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TRIBAL MARRIAGES, SAME-SEX UNIONS, 
AND AN INTERSTATE RECOGNITION 
CONUNDRUM 
Mark P. Strasser* 
Abstract: This Article focuses on the reasons for state and federal rec-
ognition of Native American polygamous unions and the implications of 
states’ recognition of these unions for the validity of same-sex marriages 
across state lines. It discusses some historical Native American domestic 
relations practices and explains why states recognized certain Native 
American marital unions that would not have been recognized had they 
been celebrated locally. This Article also analyzes the significance of the 
recognition of these unions for the debate surrounding recognition of 
same-sex unions. The historical treatment of Native American polyga-
mous unions suggests Congress has the power to assure that same-sex 
couples have the same rights and protections as do different-sex couples 
as long as their marriages were valid in the domicile at the time of cele-
bration. 
Introduction 
 Opponents of same-sex marriage suggest that the recognition of 
such marriages will lead to the recognition of polygamous marriages.1 
This argument implies both that there are no important differences 
between same-sex and polygamous unions and that the recognition of 
polygamous unions in this country is simply unfathomable. Neither of 
these implicit contentions is correct. Same-sex and polygamous un-
ions differ in important ways.2 Moreover, the United States has recog-
                                                                                                                      
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. 
1 See Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the 
Last Frontier, 16 Alaska L. Rev. 213, 230 n.105 (1999) (“[T]he recognition of same-sex 
marriage might have a slippery-slope effect leading to recognition of relationships such as 
polygamy.”); George W. Dent, Jr., “How Does Same-Sex Marriage Threaten You?,” 59 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 233, 257 (2007) (“Recognition of SSM [same-sex marriage] would also generate 
unbearable pressure to expand further the legal definition of marriage to include, at least, 
polygamy and endogamy.”). 
2 See generally Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy 
and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1505 (1997) (discussing some of the differ-
ences between same-sex marriage and Mormon polygamy). 
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nized Native American polygamous unions as a matter of course.3 
Tribes recognized marriages that states customarily considered void 
for violating an important public policy of the state.4 Nonetheless, 
most states recognized those unions as valid, even though these un-
ions would have been void had they been celebrated on non-tribal 
land.5 
 This Article focuses on why Native American polygamous unions 
were recognized by federal and state governments. It explores what 
states’ recognition of these unions means for the validity of same-sex 
marriages across state lines. Part I describes some historical Native 
American domestic relations practices and explains why states recog-
nized certain Native American marital unions that would not have 
been recognized had they been celebrated elsewhere. Part II analyzes 
what recognition of these unions means for the debate surrounding 
recognition of same-sex unions. This Article concludes by arguing 
that the historical treatment of Native American polygamous mar-
riages suggests Congress has the power to assure same-sex couples the 
same rights and protections that almost all other families enjoy when 
traveling through or moving to other states. 
I. Tribal Domestic Relations Practices 
 Historically, Native American marriage practices were given def-
erence by both the federal government and the states.6 Congress did 
not limit the types of tribal unions that the federal government would 
recognize.7 Similarly, states recognized Native American unions as 
long as they were valid under tribal customs and laws.8 In doing so, 
the states did not discuss whether these unions would have been rec-
ognized had they involved no Native Americans.9 Unfortunately, 
courts did not offer detailed explanations as to why such unions 
would be recognized.10 They did, however, imply an unspoken rule 
                                                                                                                      
3 See, e.g., Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 605 (Mich. 1889); Ortley v. Ross 
110 N.W. 982, 983 (Neb. 1907). 
4 See Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 19 (Okla. 1930); Blake v. Sessions, 220 P. 876, 878 
(Okla. 1923). 
5 See, e.g., James v. Adams, 155 P. 1121, 1122 (Okla. 1915); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 
934 (Okla. 1911). 
6 See, e.g., Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605; Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254, 255 (Minn. 1890); 
Ortley v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982, 983 (Neb. 1907). 
7 See, e.g., James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
8 See Hallowell v. Commons, 210 F. 793, 800 (8th Cir. 1914). 
9 See, e.g., James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
10 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605; Earl, 44 N.W. at 255; Ortley, 110 N.W. at 983. 
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making recognition of tribal unions mandatory but allowing local 
public policy to determine the validity of non-tribal marriages.11 
A. Tribes as Separate Sovereign Nations 
 Before delving into historical aspects of tribal marriage and 
states’ reasons for their recognition, it is important to understand the 
extent to which tribes can legally regulate their own affairs. A Native 
American tribe is an unusual legal entity.12 It is not the legal equiva-
lent of a state within the United States.13 It is also not, however, con-
sidered a foreign nation existing separately from the United States.14 
This special legal status derives from the Constitution, wherein tribes 
are explicitly mentioned and are differentiated both from states and 
from foreign nations.15 
 Indeed, the Supreme Court has described Native American tribes 
as “domestic dependent nations,” which are “completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States.”16 Yet, in the eyes of 
the Court, tribes are also separate sovereignties capable of regulating 
their internal affairs.17 In United States v. Wheeler, the Court explained 
that “until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign 
powers.”18 The Court further clarified that Native American tribes 
“possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or stat-
ute, or [withdrawn] by implication as a necessary result of their de-
pendent status.”19 Absent congressional action to the contrary, tribes 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605; Earl, 44 N.W. at 255; Ortley, 110 N.W. at 983. 
12 See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755–56 (1998); Jones v. 
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10 (1899). 
13 See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755–56 (“We have often noted, however, that the immu-
nity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the States.” (citing Blatchford 
v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991))). 
14 See Jones, 175 U.S. at 10 (“The Indian tribes within the limits of the United States are 
not foreign nations . . . .”). 
15 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
16 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
17 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 581 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“In the 
management of their internal concerns, they are dependent on no power.”). This article 
will not spell out the implications of domestic dependent nation status or discuss whether 
some other formulation would more accurately capture the legal status of the tribes. Cf. 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 53, 62 (2006) (“Indian tribes, Indian Country, and federal Indian law were and are sui 
generis—‘extraconstitutional.’”). 
18 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
19 Id. (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191(1978)). 
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can regulate their own internal affairs, including the conditions un-
der which tribal members on Native lands can marry and divorce.20 
B. Deference to Tribal Domestic Relations Law 
 It has long been recognized that tribal marital practices may not 
mirror those of the states.21 Because tribes have the authority to gov-
ern their members, tribal unions do not have to conform to the laws 
of the states in which they are located.22 The Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of whether tribal inheritance laws must conform 
to state inheritance laws in Jones v. Meehan.23 There, the Court ad-
dressed whether the eldest son of a polygamous chief would inherit 
his father’s land.24 The son’s inheritance hinged on whether the 
Court followed state or tribal inheritance law.25 Ultimately, the Court 
looked to “the laws, usages, and customs of the Chippewa Indians,” 
and decided in favor of the eldest son.26 The Court reasoned that 
Chippewa law controlled because only Congress—and not the state— 
had the power to substitute state or federal law for tribal law.27 In-
deed, “the government has never recognized any distinction as to the 
right of inheritance among the Indians between the children of the 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001) (noting that state law can have 
force within the boundaries of the reservation); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 (“Their right of 
internal self-government includes the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members.” 
(citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 
376, 380 (1896); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571–72 (1883))); see also Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 73, 74 
(2007) (“In general, state laws and regulations do not have effect inside of Indian Country 
absent Congressional authorization.” (citing Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal In-
dian Law § 6.01[2] (Lexis 2005))); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian 
Country” and the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 11 
(2005) (“The powers of tribal self-government include the authority to make criminal and 
civil laws for internal affairs. . . . Examples of “internal affairs” subject to tribal legislation 
include . . . recognition of marriage and divorce . . . .”). 
21 See, e.g., In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 745–46 (1866) (“The Shawnees have a cus-
tom of their own with regard to marriage. Some marry according to the old custom, and 
some marry by the minister.”). 
22 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581 (M’Lean, J., concurring). 
23 See 175 U.S. at 2, 29. 
24 Id. at 26 (noting that the chief had “two wives, both living at the same time”). 
25 See id. at 2, 29. 
26 See id. at 31(“[I]t is quite clear that, by the laws, usages, and customs of the Chip-
pewa Indians, old Moose Dung’s eldest son and successor as chief inherited the land of his 
father, to the exclusion of other descendants.”). 
27 See Jones, 175 U.S. at 28 (citing United States v. Shanks, 15 Minn. 369 (1870)); In re 
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 737. 
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first wife and the children of a polygamous consort, where the Indians 
by their customs, while in a tribal state, permitted polygamy.”28 
 Later, in United States v. Quiver, the Supreme Court noted a well-
established Congressional policy to “permit the personal and domes-
tic relations of the Indians with each other to be regulated . . . accord-
ing to their tribal customs and laws.”29 The Court further noted that 
this deference to tribal custom and law was accorded even to polyg-
amy and revoked only “when Congress expressly or clearly directs 
otherwise.”30 Considering in that case whether a federal criminal stat-
ute making adultery a crime could be enforced against two adulterous 
Native Americans, the Court held that the adultery law did not apply 
to the Native Americans because “bigamy, polygamy, incest, adultery 
[and] fornication . . . always hav[e] been left to the tribal customs and 
laws.31 
II. Should the Tribal Marriage Be Recognized? 
 Although the states and the federal government usually do not 
interfere with tribal domestic relations, several issues should be ad-
dressed clearly and separately when analyzing cases addressing the 
validity of Native American marriages. The first of these issues is 
whether the marriage was valid where celebrated. Even if valid where 
celebrated, a different issue is whether that marriage would also be 
recognized in a different jurisdiction where such marriages were pro-
hibited. Finally, the reasons behind the marriage’s recognition should 
be delineated. 
A. Was the Marriage Valid Where Celebrated? 
 As a general matter, courts have held that Native American mar-
riages established in accord with tribal customs and usages were valid, 
                                                                                                                      
28 Hallowell, 210 F. at 799. 
29 241 U.S. 602, 603–04 (1916). 
30 Id. at 605–06; see also Hallowell, 210 F. at 800 (“[T]he laws only of Congress, and in 
the absence of such laws were left to be governed by their own laws and customs as to do-
mestic and social practices including marriage, and whether they should practice monog-
amy or polygamy was left wholly to them.”). To date, Congress has not expressly directed 
polygamous tribal unions be declared void, although the federal government has at-
tempted to influence tribal marriage practices in other ways. See Hallowell, 210 F. at 800. 
(“Congress could have passed a law prohibiting plural marriages among tribal Indians if it 
saw fit, but it did not do so.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 
UCLA L. Rev. 1297, 1358 n.233 (1998) (discussing an attempt by the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to discourage plural marriages among the tribes). 
31 Quiver, 241 U.S. at 605. 
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as long as the marriage involved at least one tribal member and were 
on Native American lands.32 The latter qualifications were important 
because tribal and state marriage practices often had different rules 
regarding: (1) who could marry whom; (2) the formal requirements 
of marriage; and (3) the number of spouses in a marriage. As such, 
determining the validity of a tribal marriage under tribal law was a 
fact-intensive inquiry. 
 For example, some tribes did not require any formal ceremony in 
order for a couple to be considered married.33 Instead, these tribes 
merely required the parties to cohabitate as husband and wife.34 This 
practice mirrored common law marriage, in that such marriages also 
do not require any formal ceremony.35 Other tribes, however, would 
not accept mere cohabitation and instead required evidence of an 
                                                                                                                      
32 Many of the cases involved marriages between a member and a non-member of the 
tribe. See, e.g., Scott v. Epperson, 284 P. 19, 19 (Okla. 1930); Blake v. Sessions, 220 P. 876, 
876 (Okla. 1923); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 934 (Okla. 1911). In Cyr v. Walker, the court 
explained: 
So long as Indians live together under the tribal relation and tribal government, 
they are subject only to the jurisdiction of Congress. . . . They have been uni-
formly recognized as capable of regulating and managing their own tribal af-
fairs, including their domestic relations; and domestic relations formed under 
their customs and laws have been treated by the courts as valid. 
116 P. at 934 (citing Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602, 602 (Mich. 1889); Boyer v. 
Dively, 58 Mo. 510, 510 (1875)). 
33 Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
34 Id. (“Mere meeting and co-habitation as husband and wife constituted a marriage 
. . . .”). 
35 See In re Golding’s Estate, 89 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Nev. 1939) (discussing the similarities 
between the tribal marriage custom and common law marriage). The requirements of 
common law marriage themselves differed across jurisdictions. See In re McLaughlin’s Es-
tate, 30 P. 651, 655 (Wash. 1892). In In re McLaughlin, the court noted: 
 There is considerable conflict in the authorities as to the acts which are 
necessary to establish a common-law marriage, some courts even going to the 
extent of holding that continued cohabitation alone is sufficient, while others 
hold that there must have been a contract between the parties, and others to 
the still further extent that this must have been evidenced by some kind of a 
ceremony, or, at least, a declaration to that effect in the presence of other par-
ties. 
Id. Montana’s common law marriage requirement states that the party must prove that 
“(1) the parties were competent to enter into a marriage; (2) the parties assumed a marital 
relationship by mutual consent and agreement; and (3) the parties confirmed their mar-
riage by cohabitation and public repute.” State v. Bullman, 203 P.3d 768, 771–72 (Mont. 
2009) (citing In re Estate of Ober, 62 P.3d 1114 (Mont. 2003)). 
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agreement by the parties to be married.36 This approach is similar to 
the approach used by some states.37 Other tribes had several criteria 
by which to determine whether an individual was married, while oth-
ers only required that one of several criteria be met for the relation-
ship to be recognized. For example, in the Choctaw tribe, individuals 
could enter into a valid marriage by participating in a Native cere-
mony, being married by a minister, or simply living together as hus-
band and wife.38 
 While there were similarities between state and tribal marriage 
practices, there were important differences as well. For example, 
when a common law marriage has been contracted, states would re-
quire that the union be dissolved formally.39 In contrast, some tribes 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Henry v. Taylor, 93 N.W. 641, 643 (S.D. 1903) (“Granting that an agreement to 
live together, followed by cohabitation, constitutes the Indian custom of marriage, it was 
necessary to prove that Sam and Alice made an express agreement of that character, and 
actually lived together pursuant thereto, and not otherwise.”). But see Compo v. Jackson 
Iron Co., 16 N.W. 295, 296 (Mich. 1883). In Compo v. Jackson, the court commented: 
And it would be a singular state of things, under a custom for parties to take 
each other for husband and wife at pleasure, and dissolve the relation at 
pleasure, without any ceremony whatever, if the legality in law were to be 
made to depend on somebody having been present to hear their conversa-
tion, and know whether they used the word marriage or not. If we recognize 
at all these polygamous and temporary marriages, we must, of necessity, as-
sume that the marriage is constituted by the mere living together of the man 
and woman in the relation which the tribes recognize as that of matrimony. 
Id. 
37 See In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 2004) (discussing the com-
mon law requirement of “a present intent and agreement to be married”). 
38 See Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826, 829 (1847). In Wall v. Williams, the court said: 
[A]nother witness . . . stated that he was acquainted with the law of marriage 
among the Choctaws up to 1833; that they were sometimes married by a min-
ister, sometimes by a Choctaw ceremony, and sometimes a man and woman 
took each other (without ceremony), lived together and were considered 
man and wife. Marriages were also solemnized by a justice of the peace from 
an adjoining county. 
Id. 
39 See Phillips v. Dow Chem. Co., 186 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]hether 
established ceremonially or at common law, a marriage can terminate only by death, divorce, 
or court-decreed annulment.” (citing Villegas v. Griffin Indus., 975 S.W.2d 745, 750 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1998)); cf. In re Estate of Marson, 120 P.3d 382, 383 (Mont. 2005) (suggesting that be-
cause the deceased’s first common law marriage had never been dissolved, the deceased’s 
partner in the second common law marriage could at best be a putative spouse). 
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did not require any formal ceremony to dissolve a marriage.40 Instead, 
the tribe required only separation of the parties.41 
 The differences between state and tribal marriages forced courts 
charged with determining a marriage’s validity to consider a number 
of factors.42 First, they would determine what the particular tribal 
practices and usages were.43 Second, they would determine whether 
                                                                                                                      
40 See La Framboise v. Day, 161 N.W. 529, 530–31 (Minn. 1917); Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 
254, 254; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
41 See La Framboise, 161 N.W. at 530–31 (“According to the custom of the Sioux Indians 
an Indian marriage might be terminated, and either party be at liberty to marry again, by 
mere abandonment, without further ceremony.”); Cyr, 116 P. at 934 (“[T]he dissolution of 
such marriage was effected by separation of the parties, . . . which separation, by mutual 
consent or by abandonment by one or the other, was equivalent to an absolute divorce, 
and the parties thereafter were free to form other marital alliances.”). In Earl v. Godley, the 
court elaborated: 
[A]mong the Indian tribe there was a custom or law that any member of the 
tribe who desired to obtain a wife might purchase one, and the man and 
woman would thereupon, in accordance with such custom, live and cohabit 
together as husband and wife without other or further marriage ceremony; 
and that, in accordance with the usage and established custom prevailing 
among them, the parties might either of them also divorce themselves by 
dismissing or abandoning the other, without further ceremony, and there-
upon either were at liberty to take another husband or wife . . . . 
44 N.W. at 254. 
42 See, e.g., State v. Pass, 121 P.2d 882, 882 (Ariz. 1942); Palmer v. Cully, 153 P. 154, 155 
(Okla. 1915); Cyr, 116 P. at 931. The court in Palmer v. Cully found that the issues for review 
included “that plaintiff is a full-blood Seminole Indian, illiterate, and ignorant of the law; 
that she is the widow of one Kintah Palmer, a Seminole Indian, who died intestate and 
without issue, in March, 1912, seised and possessed of certain lands.” Palmer, 153 P. at 155. 
Often, courts were asked to determine whether or when parties had been married upon 
death of one of the parties so as to distribute the assets of an estate. Cyr, 116 P. at 931. In 
Cyr, the court held: 
Whether plaintiff in error is entitled to share with Joel Delonias, the son of her 
deceased husband, in said allotment depends upon whether she was Xavier 
Delonias’ wife at the time of his decease, or had been, prior to said time, di-
vorced according to the laws and customs of the Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians. 
Id. Courts were also asked to determine the validity of marriages for other reasons such as 
when the marital testimonial privilege was asserted. See State v. Pass, 121 P.2d 882, 882 
(Ariz. 1942). In State v. Pass the court stated: 
The principal witness against [Frank Pass] was Ruby Contreras Pass. Without 
her testimony it is clear there could have been no conviction. When she was 
offered by the state as a witness, defendant promptly objected on the ground 
that she was his wife and disqualified by statute to testify against him except 
with his consent. 
Id. 
43 See, e.g., Henry, 93 N.W. at 643. 
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the marriage conformed to those practices and usages.44 Third, the 
court would determine where the couple had lived.45 
 The court in In re Paquet’s Estate used these factors to determine 
whether a couple, Ophelia and Fred Paquet, had been legally married 
and thus whether Ophelia was entitled to her husband’s estate.46 Al-
though there was evidence that the two had married according to 
Clatsop Indian custom, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that 
Ophelia and Fred had not been living on Native lands but, instead, in 
a place where state law governed.47 Oregon law precluded intermar-
riage between Native-Americans and whites.48 As a result, the court 
held that the marriage was void and of no legal effect.49 The court 
explained that “[s]uch a marriage would only be valid where Indians 
lived together under the tribal relation and a tribal form of govern-
ment . . . [because] they would then be subject only to the jurisdiction 
of Congress.”50 As a result, the court held that Ophelia had no legal 
claim to Fred’s estate.51 
 Determining whether or when individuals were married also re-
quired careful examination of differing tribal marriage dissolution 
practices. For example, the Choctaw recognized different ways by 
which individuals could validly end their marriage.52 Specifically, 
those who had married ceremonially were not required to end the 
marriage ceremonially.53 Similarly, a couple married by a justice of the 
peace might end their union by the tribal custom of simply ceasing to 
live together.54 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. 
45 See, e.g., Wall, 8 Ala. at 53 (“[T]he marriage, if contracted according to Choctaw us-
age, between members of the tribe, in their own territory, before their laws were abro-
gated, was valid . . . .”). 
46 See 200 P. 911, 913 (Or. 1921). 
47 Id. at 913–14 (noting that the two had married “within Tillamook county and at a 
place where the state would have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any marriage 
contract between them”). 
48 Id. at 913 (explaining that the law prohibited any white person from marrying “any 
person having more than one-half Indian blood” (quoting 1921 Or. Laws. 2163, repealed by 
1951 OR. Laws. ch. 455 § 2)). 
49 See id. at 914. 
50 Id. 
51 In re Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. at 914. The court noted in dicta, however, that “in the in-
terests of justice, a fair and reasonable settlement should be made” because Ophelia had 
“lived with [Fred] as a good and faithful wife for more than 30 years.” Id. 
52 See Rogers v. Cordingley, 4 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn. 1942). 
53 See id. at 628–29. 
54 See id. 
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 Needless to say, a system in which individuals might end their 
marriages by simply separating can leave the status of some marriages 
unclear. It might not be clear, for example, whether an individual who 
was no longer living with his wife had left permanently or, instead, 
planned on returning.55 To make matters more complicated, it was 
sometimes not clear when and to what marriages tribal law applied. 
For example, in Palmer v. Cully the Oklahoma Supreme Court exam-
ined tribal law, federal treaties and state laws to determine whether 
two Seminoles had legally married.56 Pheney Bowlegs had married 
Kintah Palmer in accord with Seminole custom in 1905.57 Kintah 
Palmer, however, had previously married and lived with another 
woman, Lowina Palmer, until about a year before he married Pheney 
Bowlegs.58 Lowina did not formally divorce Kintah in accordance with 
local law until 1911.59 
 The court found that prior to April 28, 1904, parties married under 
Seminole custom could be divorced according to Seminole custom by 
simply separating physically.60 After that date, however, a marriage could 
only be dissolved under state law though court proceedings.61 The court 
found that because Kintah and his first wife, Lowina, had only physically 
separated and not obtained a divorce through court proceedings, Kin-
tah and his second wife, Pheney, could not have legally married because 
bigamy was not legal under state law.62 Had the court applied tribal law, 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Wall, 11 Ala. at 828–29 (“[Wall and Williams] lived together as husband and wife 
. . . and to avoid a prosecution, left the county and went to his tribe west of the Mississippi, 
and has never returned. But [Williams] has received letters from him, in which he threat-
ened to return . . . .”); La Framboise, 161 N.W. at 530–31 (fixing the time of divorce for 
Alexis and Quana after Quana had left but then returned to Alexis). 
56 153 P. at 155–57. 
57 Id. at 155. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. at 156, 157. 
61 See Palmer, 153 P. at 157 (“Upon . . . erection of the state, members of the Seminole 
Tribe became citizens of Oklahoma, subject to the general laws of the state relative to mar-
riage and divorce, since which time the validity of their marriage contracts and all rights 
consequent or arising therefrom have been dependent upon such laws.”). 
62 See id. (“The marriage of the plaintiff and Kintah Palmer in 1905 in accordance with 
the Seminole laws was therefore invalid, he at the time having a living, undivorced wife, 
and being incompetent to contract the same . . . .”). The court noted but did not give any 
weight to the fact that Kintah and Pheney were viewed by all who knew them as husband 
and wife. The court stated: 
It was the apparent purpose of plaintiff and Kintah Palmer to contract a law-
ful marriage, to accomplish which they did all things deemed necessary ac-
cording to their understanding of the requirements, and assumed the mar-
riage relation innocently and in good faith, believing that they had complied 
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the marriage might have been found valid if Seminole custom recog-
nized plural marriage.63 
 Determining whether a marriage was valid was also complicated 
by the fact that some tribes—but not all—recognized plural mar-
riages.64 In Pompey, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the valid-
ity of the marriage between John Pompey and Rose Lottie.65 At the 
time that John and Rose allegedly married, John was already married 
to someone else.66 Both marriages had, however, occurred before 
April 28, 1904. Therefore, unlike the first marriage in Palmer, it was 
clear that tribal law—and not state law—governed the marriage. The 
sole issue before the court was whether the Seminoles recognized plu-
ral marriages.67 
 The court acknowledged the marriage’s validity should be de-
termined by the “tribal laws, customs, and usages of the Seminole 
tribe.”68 The defendants asserted that the Seminole laws quoted in 
Palmer demonstrated that the Seminoles did not recognize plural 
                                                                                                                      
with the law in this respect. They were recognized as husband and wife by 
their kinsmen, friends, and acquaintances, all of whom knew of their past 
domestic relations. They lived together in this manner for eight years, and for 
nearly a year after Kintah had been divorced from his former wife, and until 
his death, mutually agreeing, understanding, and believing that they were in 
law husband and wife. 
Id. 
63 See id. at 157–58. 
64 Okla. Land Co. v. Thomas, 127 P. 8, 9 (Okla. 1912) (“[P]rior to the passage of said 
act . . . it was customary for a man to cohabit with two or more women, all of whom were 
considered as his wives . . . .”). In Pompey v. King the court held: 
In the instant case there was testimony tending to prove a Seminole custom 
permitting plural marriages. No law of the Seminole Nation prohibiting plu-
ral marriages has been called to our attention; hence we are of the opinion 
that the learned trial judge committed error in preventing the jury from de-
termining whether, under the facts proved, the custom existed among the 
Seminole Indians permitting plural marriages. 
225 P. 175, 175 (Okla. 1923). Similarly, in Ortley v. Ross the court held: 
The evidence shows that the laws and customs of the Santee Sioux Indians, 
place slight restrictions on matrimonial alliances between members of the 
tribe, that polygamy was practiced with impunity, that the only ceremony req-
uisite was a mutual agreement between the parties to live together as husband 
and wife . . . . 
110 N.W. at 982. 
65 See 225 P. at 175. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. 
218 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:207 
marriages.69 The Pompey court, however, noted that the laws quoted in 
Palmer did not “directly or indirectly” prohibit plural marriages.70 The 
court further noted that defendants had presented no other examples 
of Seminole laws suggesting that Seminole custom permitted such 
unions.71 Consequently, the Pompey court remanded the case so that a 
jury could determine whether Seminole custom permitted plural 
marriage.72 
B. State Recognition of Tribal Marriages 
 Once a marriage is determined to be valid under tribal law, the 
next question is whether that marriage would be recognized by the 
state.73 In Cyr, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that the tribes 
“have been uniformly recognized as capable of regulating and manag-
ing their own tribal affairs, including their domestic relations,” and 
noted that “domestic relations formed under [tribal] customs and 
laws have been treated by the courts as valid.”74 Indeed, as a general 
matter, courts finding a marriage valid under tribal laws would also 
find it valid under state laws as long as the marriage did not involve 
the imposition of fraud on any other jurisdiction.75 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. 
70 Pompey, 225 P. at 175. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 176. 
73 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605. 
74 116 P. at 934. In another case, approximately four years later, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court noted: 
 It has been very generally, if not universally, held by the American courts, 
that marriages contracted between tribal Indians, according to the laws and 
customs of their tribe, at a time when the tribal relations and government 
were existing, would be upheld, in the absence of a federal law rendering 
such tribal laws and customs invalid. 
James v. Adams, 155 P. 1121, 1122 (Okla. 1915) (citing Cyr, 116 P. at 934). 
75 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605; Compo, 16 N.W. at 295, 301 (noting that generally “mar-
riages which are valid where made and not fraud on any other jurisdiction, are valid eve-
rywhere”). In Kobogum the court stated: 
The decisions in Alabama, Tennessee, Missouri, and Texas . . . all sustain the 
right of Indians to regulate their own marriages, and there is no respectable 
body of authority against it; on the contrary, it is a principle of universal law 
that marriages valid by the law governing both parties when made must be 
treated as valid everywhere. 
43 N.W. at 605. 
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 Oklahoma courts, however, did not always defer to tribal customs 
if they felt that a marriage was contrary to that state’s public policy.76 
For example, in Blake v. Sessions, the court examined whether a mar-
riage between James Grayson and Myrtle Segro was valid under Okla-
homa law.77 James was one-quarter African and three-fourths Creek 
Indian.78 Myrtle was one-fourth white and three-fourths Creek In-
dian.79 The court noted that even if the marriage “had been cele-
brated and solemnized by all the priests, bishops, ministers, and civil 
authorities, authorized to perform marriage ceremonies in this state,” 
it would still have been “unlawful.”80 The court rejected the argument 
that Creek tribal law rather than Oklahoma law determined the mar-
riage’s validity because it held that forbidding interracial marriage was 
“entirely within the [police] power of the state.”81 
 Instead of focusing on whether Oklahoma had the power to pro-
hibit interracial marriages, the Blake court should have focused on 
whether a marriage that was valid under the law of the sovereign at 
the time of celebration would be recognized by Oklahoma.82 James 
and Myrtle were each of Creek descent, and they celebrated their 
marriage according to Creek law on Creek lands.83 The tribe’s sover-
eign power to determine who could marry whom would militate in 
favor of the marriage’s validity.84 
 Indeed, in a factually similar case the same court just seven years 
later held a tribal interracial marriage was valid because tribal law and 
not state law determined its validity. In Scott v. Epperson, the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Blake, 220 P. at 878, 879. 
77 See id. at 878. 
78 Id. at 877. 
79 Id. at 878. 
80 Id. 
81 Blake, 220 P. at 879. The court rejected plaintiff’s assertion that: 
[T]he marriage law of the state is not applicable to marriages between citi-
zens of the Creek Nation, and that the Legislature of the state cannot pass any 
laws regulating marriages between Indians, and assert as a reason therefor 
that the United States reserved the right to legislate and regulate marriages 
between citizens of the Five Civilized Tribes, and that the state statute has no 
application. 
Id. It reasoned that “the laws regulating marriages come clearly within the police power of 
the state, and, in the exercise of the state’s sovereign right, it has the sole and only power 
within the state to regulate who shall, or who shall not, marry.” Id. 
82 See id. at 878–79; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967) (striking down 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law). 
83 See Blake, 220 P. at 876–79. 
84 See, e.g., James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
220 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:207 
Supreme Court considered the validity of the marriage between Lucy 
Grayson, who was three-quarters Seminole and one-fourth African-
American, and James Scott, who was a full-blood Creek Indian.85 They 
had been married in Indian Territory in accordance with local law 
before Oklahoma became a state and before the enactment of Okla-
homa’s constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting interracial 
marriage.86 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the marriage be-
tween Lucy and James valid, reasoning that those provisions prohibit-
ing interracial marriage were intended to prevent future marriages 
rather than annul existing ones.87 
 The Scott and Blake decisions stand in opposition to each other 
since both marriages had been valid under tribal law.88 Moreover, nei-
ther party in either Blake or Scott was attempting to skirt Oklahoma 
law by marrying on tribal land. These cases can only be reconciled if 
Oklahoma law and thus Oklahoma public policy rather than Creek 
law governed the marriage at issue in Blake.89 Yet, the law which cre-
ated the state of Oklahoma provided that Native law would not be pre-
empted by the new state’s law.90 Oklahoma courts sometimes ignored 
this provision and ruled as if tribal authority had been destroyed upon 
the creation of the state.91 
 If those courts were correct and tribal authority had been de-
stroyed upon Oklahoma statehood, then the marriage in Blake should 
have been evaluated in light of existing Oklahoma state law and the 
                                                                                                                      
85 See 284 P. at 19. 
86 See id. at 20. The court held: 
We are of the opinion that there was no inhibition against the marriage of 
Lucy Grayson, who was of African descent, and James Scott, a full-blood In-
dian, in the Indian Territory in 1903 . . . . 
 But it is contended that even though James Scott and Lucy Grayson were 
legally married in 1903, the marriage relation could not be maintained be-
tween them after statehood by reason of the applicable provisions of the stat-
utes and constitution, which were put in force over the Indian Territory at 
statehood. 
Id. 
87 See id. at 21 (“We are of the opinion that section 7499 was never intended as an an-
nulment act, but as to those domiciled within the state it was merely intended to prohibit 
future marriages between such persons.”). 
88 Compare Scott, 284 P. at 21 (finding an interracial marriage valid under tribal law), 
with Blake, 220 P. at 878 (invalidating an interracial marriage under Oklahoma state law). 
89 See Blake, 220 P. at 878. 
90 See Stacy L. Leeds, Defeat or Mixed Blessing? Tribal Sovereignty and the State of Sequoyah, 
43 Tulsa L. Rev. 5, 10 (2007). 
91 See id. at 11–12 (discussing the “misconception that Oklahoma had already obtained 
full jurisdictional powers everywhere within the state”). 
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public policy behind it and not tribal law as it existed at the time of 
the marriage.92 Moreover, if tribal authority had been destroyed, the 
court would not have had to decide whether marriages performed on 
tribal land would be recognized outside of the tribe’s jurisdiction.93 
Rather, the court could have ruled the marriage invalid because it was 
invalid under existing Oklahoma law.94 Tribal law, however, had not 
been preempted or destroyed when Oklahoma became a state, and 
consequently Oklahoma law did not govern a marriage celebrated by 
a tribal member on Native lands in accord with local custom.95 Had 
the Blake court followed the majority of courts and applied tribal law 
to determine the validity of the marriage, James and Myrtle’s mar-
riage would have been valid.96 
 Oklahoma courts did apply the majority rule when determining 
the validity of interracial marriages across state lines. For example, in 
Eggers v. Olson an interracial couple permanently residing in Okla-
homa married in Arkansas to evade the Oklahoma law banning inter-
racial marriages.97 The Oklahoma court held the marriage invalid 
because the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage—here, 
Oklahoma—determines the validity of the marriage at the time of its 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Blake, 220 P. at 878. 
93 Id. 
94 See In re Walker’s Estate, 46 P. 67, 69 (Ariz. 1896); see also Wilbur’s Estate v. Bingham, 
35 P. 407, 409 (Wash. 1894) (holding that intermarriage between Indian and white was not 
valid in light of governing territorial law, notwithstanding that the marriage was in accord 
with tribal custom). The In re Walker’s Estate the court held: 
There are not two sovereignties here, one for the power owning the reserva-
tion and one for the territory. There is only one sovereignty here,—that of 
the United States,—which delegates its power to the territory to legislate on 
all rightful subjects of legislation; and the legislative acts of the territory are 
operative in all parts of the territory, including Indian and all other executive 
or legislative reservations, unless expressly forbidden by the congress of the 
United States. 
46 P. at 69. 
95 See Leeds, supra note 90, at 10–12. 
96 See, e.g., In re Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. at 914 (suggesting that an interracial marriage 
invalid under Oregon law would have been valid had it been celebrated in accord with 
tribal law on tribal lands). 
97 231 P. 483, 483–84 (Okla. 1924) (“About two years prior to her death she [Emily 
Lewis, a Choctaw Indian] went out of the state with a negro by the name of William Yates, 
and married him at Ft. Smith in the state of Arkansas on April 13, 1914, and after about a 
week returned to her home with him in Haskell county, where they lived together until her 
death.”). 
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celebration.98 The Oklahoma court was correct to apply Oklahoma 
law.99 
 State attempts to prevent interracial marriage imposed numerous 
social and legal burdens. Socially, these laws destroyed otherwise 
healthy families.100 Legally, different states’ laws regarding the validity 
of interracial marriages meant that a marriage might be permissible 
in certain states but impermissible in others. For example, Oklahoma 
law prevented individuals of African descent from marrying individu-
als not of African descent.101 Arizona law, on the other hand, pre-
vented whites from marrying non-whites.102 As a result, a marriage 
between someone of African descent and a full-blooded Indian, would 
be valid in Arizona but not in Oklahoma.103 
 Further, Arizona’s law had a special twist, which prohibited indi-
viduals who were part Caucasian from, in reality, marrying anyone.104 
In State v. Pass, the court explained that “a descendant of mixed blood 
                                                                                                                      
98 See id. at 485. The court reasoned: 
[T]he marriage of William Yates with Emily Lewis was prohibited by the laws 
of this state, [Oklahoma], and they could not, while citizens of this state, 
evade the law of marriage by going out of the state and marrying under the 
laws of another state and then return to this state to live and maintain the 
marriage assumed in that state, which was prohibited in this state, and expect 
the marriage to be recognized and protected in this state. The inhibition is 
not only against the form but the substance also. 
Id.; see also Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 122–23 (10th Cir. 1944) (upholding de-
termination that evasive, interracial marriage was void under Oklahoma law); Baker v. 
Carter, 68 P.2d 85, 86 (Okla. 1937) (“If it is a fact that plaintiff is of African descent and 
the defendant is a full-blood Indian, then their marriage is a nullity. This is so even though 
the marriage was contracted in another state, the parties being residents of this state.” 
(citations omitted)); Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws § 283 (1971) 
(declaring that the validity of a marriage celebrated in accord with the law of the state of 
celebration is determined by the law of the state which had the most significant relation-
ship to the couple at the time of marriage, which is generally the state of domicile at the 
time of the marriage). 
99 See Eggers, 231 P. at 485–86. Whether Oklahoma could maintain such a law without 
violating federal constitutional guarantees is, of course, a separate issue. Antimiscegena-
tion laws were not struck down until 1967. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
100 See In re Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. at 914 (invalidating marriage of couple that had 
been together for over three decades). 
101 Eggers, 231 P. at 484 (“These provisions of our law apply to all persons, citizens, resi-
dents, and transients in the state, and are intended to prohibit marriage of the descen-
dants of the African race with any other race in this state.”). 
102 Pass, 121 P.2d at 884 (“The evident purpose of the miscegenation statute was to 
prevent the named races, to wit, Indians, Negroes, etc., from mixing their blood with the 
blood of the white man.”). 
103 Compare Eggers, 231 P. at 484, with Pass, 121 P.2d at 884. 
104 See Pass, 121 P.2d at 884. 
2010] Tribal Marriages, Same-Sex Unions & Interstate Recognition 223 
. . . cannot marry a Caucasian or a part Caucasian, for the reason he is 
part Indian. He cannot marry an Indian or a part Indian because he 
is part Caucasian. For the same reason a descendant of mixed Negro 
and Caucasian blood may not contract marriage with a Negro or a 
part Negro, etc.”105 Although recognizing that this result was “ab-
surd,” the court did not strike down the statute.106 Rather, it expressed 
hope that “the legislature will correct it by naming the percentage of 
Indian and other tabooed blood that will invalidate a marriage.”107 
 Generally, laws prohibiting miscegenation were alleged to pro-
mote an important public policy.108 Similarly, polygamous marriages 
were seen as invalid because they violated an important public pol-
icy.109 Considering the strong public policy rationale for invalidating 
these marriages, it might be thought surprising that some courts felt 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., State v. Miller, 29 S.E.2d 751, 752 (N.C. 1944) (“The section of the Consti-
tution and the statute referred to above, provide in substance, that all marriages between a 
white person and a negro or between a white person and a person of negro descent to the 
third generation, inclusive, shall be void.”); In re Atkins’ Estate, 3 P.2d 682, 686 (Okla. 
1931) (Riley, J., dissenting) (“[T]he pretended marriage between this Indian and negro 
was illegal and void. No marriage in fact could have been consummated in Oklahoma, at 
the time heretofore indicated or thereafter, between a negro and an Indian or white, ei-
ther by ceremony, common law, or statute.”). In Grant v. Butt the court explained: 
Section 1438 of the Code 1932, provides: “It shall be unlawful for any white 
man to intermarry with any woman of either the Indian or negro races, or any mu-
latto, mestizo, or half-breed, or for any white woman to intermarry with any per-
son other than a white man, or for any mulatto, half-breed, Indian, negro or 
mestizo to intermarry with a white woman; and any such marriage, or attempted 
marriage, shall be utterly null and void and of none effect . . . .” 
17 S.E.2d 689, 692 (S.C. 1941). 
109 See Whitney v. Whitney, 134 P.2d 357, 359 (Okla. 1942) (“But, if one of the parties 
to a so-called common law marriage has a living spouse of an undissolved marriage, the 
common law marriage attempted is as polygamous and plural and, therefore, as void as a 
ceremonial marriage attempted under the same circumstances.”); Pennegar v. State, 10 
S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889). In Heflinger v. Heflinger the court stated: 
 Undoubtedly, the general rule is that a marriage valid where performed is 
valid everywhere; but there are exceptions to the rule as well established as 
the rule itself. These exceptions are generally embraced in two classes: First, 
marriages deemed contrary to the laws of nature as generally recognized in 
Christian countries, and include only those which are void for polygamy or 
incest; second, marriages forbidden by statute because contrary to the public 
policy of the state. 
118 S.E. 316, 320 (Va. 1923) (citing Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); Penne-
gar, 10 S.W. at 305). 
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compelled to recognize tribal marriages that were otherwise consid-
ered void under state law. 
C. Why Must Tribal Marriages Be Recognized? 
 Courts offered surprisingly different reasons as to why tribal mar-
riages had to be recognized.110 For example, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court noted that the “general rule” in Minnesota was “that marriages 
valid by the laws of the country where they are entered into are bind-
ing here” and that “the same rule must be adopted in relation to Na-
tive American marriages, where the tribal relation still exists.”111 This 
justification implies that tribal marriages, like foreign polygamous 
marriages, should be given deference. The court, however, did not 
seem to suggest that tribal marriages should be given more deference 
than marriages entered into under a foreign nation’s laws. 
 In contrast, the Nebraska Supreme Court suggested that tribal 
practices were owed greater deference than foreign polygamous mar-
riages.112 In Ortley v. Ross, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a 
polygamous marriage was valid.113 The court noted that the union at 
issue would not have been valid “if this marriage had taken place be-
tween citizens of the United States in any state of the Union.”114 It 
noted, however, that it applied “a liberal rule” when determining the 
validity of tribal marriages.115 Specifically, it cited the Michigan Su-
preme Court’s decision in Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co. for the proposi-
tion that “marriages valid by the law governing both parties when 
made must be treated as valid everywhere.”116 
                                                                                                                      
110 See Earl, 44 N.W. at 255; Morgan v. M’Ghee, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 13, 14–15 (1844). 
111 Earl, 44 N.W. at 255; see also Morgan, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) at 14 (“Our courts of justice 
recognize as valid all marriages of a foreign country, if made in pursuance of the forms 
and usages of that country; and there is no reason why a marriage made and consum-
mated in an Indian Nation should be subject to a different rule of action.”). 
112 Ortley, 110 N.W. at 983. 
113 Id. (“as the alleged marriage between the father and mother of the plaintiff was po-
lygamous”). 
114 Id. 
115 Id.; see also Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 519, 529 (1875) (“Although located within the 
State lines, yet so long as their tribal customs are adhered to, and the Federal Government 
manages their affairs by agents, they are not regarded as subject to the State laws, so far at 
least, as marriage, inheritance, etc. are concerned.”). 
116 Ortley, 110 N.W. at 983 (citing Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605); see also Johnson v. John-
son’s Adm’r, 30 Mo. 72, 73(1860) (“It is well settled, as a general proposition, that a mar-
riage, valid according to the law or custom of the place where it is contracted, is valid eve-
rywhere.”). 
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 In Kobogum the court noted that the “United States supreme 
court and the state courts have recognized as law that no state laws 
have any force over Indians in their tribal relations.”117 As such, the 
court reasoned that the state law prohibiting polygamous marriages 
did not invalidate a tribal polygamous marriage under tribal law.118 
The court, however, still had to decide whether this valid tribal law 
marriage would also be recognized by Michigan.119 
 On this point, the Kobogum court noted that no federal laws or 
treaties addressed or “interfer[ed] with” Indian marriage usages.120 
Thus, the court suggested, the federal government might have pro-
hibited polygamous unions but chose not to and instead permitted 
tribal law and custom to govern domestic relations.121 The court rea-
soned that by thus refraining from regulating Native American do-
mestic relations law, the federal government made it possible for the 
tribes to choose whether to recognize polygamous unions.122 
 The court’s analysis, however, is faulty. For example, the court 
noted that it “must either hold that there can be no valid Indian mar-
riage, or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian 
usage are so regarded. There is no middle ground which can be 
taken, so long as our own laws are not binding on the tribes.”123 Here 
the court implied that jurisdictions which refuse to recognize Native 
American polygamous marriages would also refuse to recognize all 
non-polygamous Native American marriages. Moreover because non-
polygamous marriages entered into in foreign countries are recog-
nized, the court implied that polygamous marriages entered into in 
foreign countries must also be recognized.124 The court’s statement 
                                                                                                                      
117 43 N.W. at 605 (citations omitted). 
118 Id. (“The testimony now in this case shows what, as matter of history, we are proba-
bly bound to know judicially, that among these Indians polygamous marriages have always 
been recognized as valid . . . .”). 
119 A finding that one jurisdiction permitted certain unions would be no guarantee 
that such a union would be recognized in a different jurisdiction. Suppose, for example, 
that State A recognized polygamous unions, but State B did not. A court determining 
whether State B recognized a polygamous marriage entered into in State A might admit 
that the union was recognized in State A but nonetheless deny its validity in State B. See 
Ortley, 110 N.W. at 983 (noting that “the alleged marriage between the father and mother 
of the plaintiff was polygamous”). 
120 43 N.W. at 605. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 190 N.W. 427, 428 (Iowa 1922) (recognizing the 
contested marriage because, although the deceased could have taken four wives, the “mar-
riage between deceased and claimant was not in itself polygamous”). 
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that either all or no marriages are valid where celebrated must be ac-
corded recognition is simply false.125 Indeed, the Michigan Supreme 
Court later held that polygamous marriages need not be recognized 
even if valid where celebrated.126 
 The court seemed to suggest that it would afford Native Ameri-
can polygamous marriages the same deference as foreign polygamous 
marriages. But a polygamous marriage valid in another country would 
likely nonetheless be denied recognition in the United States.127 This 
would suggest that Native American polygamous marriages also 
should not be recognized. The Kobogum court reasoned that tribes 
“were placed by the constitution of the United States beyond our ju-
risdiction, and we had no more right to control their domestic usages 
than those of Turkey or India.”128 But the relevant question is not 
whether such marriages are valid where celebrated but whether they 
will be recognized here. Foreign polygamous marriages valid where 
celebrated were generally not recognized elsewhere, and the court’s 
analysis suggested that the Native American polygamous marriages 
should not have been recognized.129 
 The Kobogum analysis suggests that the recognition of both for-
eign and tribal polygamous marriages depends upon state public pol-
icy and not federal law.130 But if that were true, neither kind of po-
lygamous marriage would be recognized as a general matter, although 
there might be individual instances in which plural marriages would 
be recognized for certain purposes or because of compelling individ-
ual circumstances.131 Such exceptions would be rare.132 Indeed, many 
                                                                                                                      
125 Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605. 
126 See In re Miller’s Estate, 214 N.W. 428, 429 (Mich. 1927). 
127 See Ex parte Chace, 58 A. 978, 980 (R.I. 1904) (“[A] polygamous marriage, although 
valid and binding in the country where it was contracted, would probably be denied valid-
ity in all countries where such unions are prohibited.”). 
128 43 N.W. at 605. 
129 See Earle v. Earle, 126 N.Y.S. 317, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1910) (“The [polygamous] 
marriage, being odious by common consent of the nations, is not protected by the rules of 
international law . . . .”). 
130 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605. 
131 Polygamous marriages have sometimes been recognized for certain purposes. At is-
sue in In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate was the estate of an individual who had died intestate. See 
In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d 499, 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). The California 
appellate court recognized the inheritance rights of both wives. See id. at 502. A different 
case in which a polygamous marriage might be recognized might involve an individual 
who had remarried based on the reasonable belief that her spouse was dead but subse-
quently discovered her first husband was alive after all. See Steinke v. Steinke, 357 A.2d 674, 
683 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975). The second (and plural) marriage might be recognized as long 
as the first husband divorced his wife. See id. (“There is also what might be described as a 
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states refuse to recognize foreign polygamous marriages for any pur-
pose, even if validly celebrated elsewhere.133 
 This refusal to recognize foreign polygamous marriages is sup-
ported by federal case law. The Supreme Court, in Lee Lung v. Patter-
son, upheld a refusal to permit the second (polygamous) wife of Lee 
Lung to enter the United States because she was not viewed as his 
valid wife.134 Had she been recognized as his lawful spouse, she would 
have been permitted entry.135 The court noted that a federal law pro-
hibiting polygamous marriages negated the argument that the federal 
government would recognize such unions.136 
 Just as a state might refuse to recognize a polygamous union 
celebrated in another country on the basis of public policy, states 
seem free to refuse to recognize a polygamous union celebrated ac-
cording to tribal usages.137 If Native American polygamous unions 
were treated the same as foreign polygamous unions, state courts 
would almost always refuse to recognize them.138 But just the opposite 
                                                                                                                      
good faith bigamy exception. Thus, a husband may obtain a divorce if he returns after an 
absence of two years, to find that his wife, believing him dead, has remarried; his wife’s 
second marriage is then undisturbed. The same right is given a wife.” (citing 23 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 10 (West 1972)). 
132 See Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472, 473 (1844) (“[A] woman whose 
husband suddenly left her without notice, and saying, when he went out, that he should 
return immediately, and who is absent between three and four years, though she have 
made inquiry after him, and is ignorant of his being alive, but honestly believes him to be 
dead, if she marries again, is guilty of polygamy.”). 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Tenney, 11 P. 472, 479 (Ariz. 1886) (“Every bigamous or 
polygamous marriage is void . . . .”); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Ark. 1957) (“The 
general rule is, of course, that a marriage valid where it is celebrated is recognized as being 
valid everywhere. But there are certain exceptions to the rule: (1) Polygamous marriage.” 
(citation omitted)); Marianacci v. Marianacci, 299 N.Y.S. 146, 149 (Fam. Ct. 1937) (“The 
law does not recognize polygamous marriages, and the court will not, by even indirection, 
sanction or acquiesce in such marriages.”); United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 
886, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1901) (suggesting that no foreign polygamous unions would be recog-
nized as valid). 
134 See 186 U.S. 168, 173 (1902). 
135 See United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 468–69 (1900) (“When the fact is estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the authorities, that the person claiming to enter, either as wife 
or minor child, is in fact the wife or minor child of one of the members of a class men-
tioned in the treaty as entitled to enter, then that person is entitled to admission without 
the certificate.”). 
136 See Lee Lung, 186 U.S. at 173; see also Rohwer v. Dist. Ct. of First Judicial Dist., 125 P. 
671, 674 (Utah 1912) (noting that “Congress had passed laws whereby polygamous and 
plural marriages were prohibited”). 
137 See James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
138 Cf. In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d at 502. The Dalip Singh Bir court reasoned, 
“‘Public policy’ would not be affected by dividing the money equally between the two 
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is true. As a general matter, such marriages contracted by at least one 
tribal member on Native lands were recognized as long as it was also 
valid in light of tribal law or custom.139 This surprising result was not 
adequately explained in any of the opinions. 
 One plausible explanation of the tendency of state courts to rec-
ognize Native American plural marriages involves deference to fed-
eral law. The Kobogum court correctly noted that there were no federal 
laws or treaties “on the subject of Indian marriages.”140 This com-
ment, however, incorrectly suggests that no applicable federal laws 
existed when, in fact, some federal treaties were relevant. For in-
stance, as the court noted, “numerous” treaties between the United 
States and this tribe “recognize” inheritance tribal practices.141 The 
court’s reference to these treaties suggests that it recognized polyga-
mous tribal marriages not just because they were valid where cele-
brated but also because federal treaties required that the unions be 
recognized, at least for certain purposes such as inheritance rights. 
 Many courts seemed to recognize Native American plural mar-
riages merely because they were valid where celebrated. Such a justifi-
cation, however, does not explain why Native American polygamous 
marriages were recognized but foreign polygamous marriages were 
not. It seems that these courts were implicitly relying on federal inac-
tion and action as the legal foundation for recognizing Native Ameri-
can polygamous marriages but not foreign polygamous marriages.142 
 Federal inaction supported their recognition because Congress 
refused to supplant tribal laws and customs with respect to marriage, 
thereby validating a marriage as long as it involved at least one tribal 
member, was celebrated on Native lands, and was in accord with tribal 
law or custom.143 Federal action supported the recognition of Native 
American polygamous unions because the federal government had 
signed a treaty agreeing that tribal family relations as defined by tribal 
custom and law would be recognized by the United States.144 
                                                                                                                      
wives, particularly since there is no contest between them and they are the only interested 
parties.” Id. 
139 See James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 1122. 
140 See 43 N.W. at 605. 
141 Id. 
142 See Hallowell, 210 F. at 799 (“[T]he government has never recognized any distinc-
tion as to the right of inheritance among the Indians between the children of the first wife 
and the children of a polygamous consort, where the Indians by their customs, while in a 
tribal state, permitted polygamy.”). 
143 See, e.g., James, 155 P. at 1122; Cyr, 116 P. at 934. 
144 See Kobogum, 43 N.W. at 605. 
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 Federal laws and treaties preempt state laws.145 Therefore, a 
treaty requiring that Native American polygamous families be recog-
nized in light of tribal law requires states to recognize such families 
even if the states could have refused to recognize foreign polygamous 
families not covered by a similar treaty. 
 If the United States entered into a multilateral treaty specifying 
that polygamous marriages which were valid where celebrated would 
be recognized here, then states would have to recognize foreign po-
lygamous marriages even if those unions violated an important public 
policy of the state. The existence of a treaty validating Native Ameri-
can marital unions (at least for purposes of inheritance laws) meant 
that states had to recognize those marriages, while the absence of a 
treaty requiring that foreign polygamous unions be recognized left 
the states free to decide whether to recognize those marriages. 
III. Application of the Tribal Marriage Recognition Practices 
to Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Unions 
 Commentators sometimes suggest that the recognition of same-
sex unions will lead to a parade of horribles including the recognition 
of polygamous unions.146 Although the unions are distinguishable, 
Native American polygamy cases provide some important lessons for 
those interested in securing marriage equality.147 
                                                                                                                      
145 See U.S. Const. art VI, § 2. The Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Id. 
146 See Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Note, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the 
Congressional Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 Va. L. Rev. 435, 437–38 (2009) (“Contemporary 
critics of same-sex marriage invoke legalized polygamy as the inexorable result of expand-
ing marriage rights.”). 
147 Cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 434 n.52 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, Cal Const. art. I, § 7.5. The court commented that “[a]lthough the 
historic disparagement of and discrimination against gay individuals and gay couples 
clearly is no longer constitutionally permissible, the state continues to have a strong and 
adequate justification for refusing to officially sanction polygamous or incestuous relation-
ships because of their potentially detrimental effect on a sound family environment.” Id. 
230 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:207 
A. The Danger of Recognizing Same-Sex Unions 
 Opponents of marriage equality for same-sex couples have of-
fered a variety of public policy arguments to justify their position.148 
Some commentators imply that same-sex marriage is too novel and 
contentious to permit.149 Others argue that recognition of such un-
ions would be dangerous and might lead to the recognition of a 
whole host of currently prohibited relationships.150 
 Same-sex marriage, however, is becoming much less novel. Further, 
jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriage and civil unions have not 
experienced any of the dire consequences predicted by same-sex mar-
riage opponents.151 Many other arguments offered against same-sex mar-
riage have been similarly unpersuasive because they were based either on 
errors in logic or on wildly implausible empirical claims. For example, 
the New York Court of Appeals justified its state ban on same-sex mar-
riage on three grounds.152 First, it found that “the Legislature could ra-
tionally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to 
promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-
sex relationships.”153 Second, the court reasoned that “[h]eterosexual 
intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children; ho-
mosexual intercourse does not.”154 Third, the court found that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Phipps, supra note 146, at 437–38. 
149 See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, From Slavery to Same-Sex Marriage: Comity Versus Public Policy 
in Inter-Jurisdictional Recognition of Controversial Domestic Relations, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1855, 
1919–20 (discussing “contemporary same-sex marriage and similar contentious novel 
forms of family relationships”). 
150 See, e.g., Hema Chatlani, In Defense of Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead 
Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 Appalachian J.L. 101, 128 
(2006) (“The primary argument set forth by opponents of gay marriage is that opening 
the door to same-sex marriage will result in a parade of horribles, such as bestiality, incest, 
and polygamy.”); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1253, 
1316 (2008) (“[Opponents of same-sex marriage] routinely contend that the legal recog-
nition of gay and lesbian unions would be the first step down a slippery slope that would 
ultimately foreclose legal prohibitions on minors entering into marriage, polygamy, incest, 
and even bestiality.”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a 
Woman, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 1365, 1378 (2007) (“[T]he attempt to legalize same-sex marriage 
or give equivalent legal status and benefits to same-sex couples constitutes a very real and 
dangerous attack upon the institution of conjugal marriage.”). 
151 Staszewski, supra note 150, at 1317 (“[T]he slippery-slope argument is not sup-
ported by the experience of a single jurisdiction that has legally recognized same-sex mar-
riage or registered partnerships.”). 
152 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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Legislature could rationally believe that it is better, other things being 
equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father.”155 
 These justifications, however, are specious. The first rationale 
presents a false dichotomy and then suggests that the Legislature 
acted reasonably when choosing one option over the other. But the 
Legislature did not have to choose between permitting different-sex 
couples to marry and permitting same-sex couples to marry. On the 
contrary, as Chief Justice Kaye pointed out in dissent, “[t]here are 
enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone.”156 
 Suppose that a legislature banned marriages between the elderly 
because their sexual relations were less likely to be procreative.157 
Even if such a law did not offend due process guarantees, one would 
wonder why it would be necessary to choose between permitting the 
elderly and permitting the non-elderly to marry.158 Permitting the 
elderly to marry would in no way undermine the ability or desire of 
the non-elderly to marry, just as permitting same-sex marriage would 
in no way undermine the ability or desire of opposite-sex couples to 
marry. Such a policy is a specious attempt to justify a policy that had 
been adopted for other reasons. 
 The second rationale was no more persuasive than the first. After 
all, many same-sex and opposite-sex couples marry but have no inter-
est in raising children. Marriage provides benefits both to society and 
the individuals themselves that are unrelated to the having or raising 
of children.159 Consequently, the fact that a couple—be they elderly 
or of the same-sex—will not have children should not be a bar to their 
being able to marry. 
 Even if the third justification were true and it would be better for 
children to grow up with a mother and a father rather than two 
mothers or two fathers, that would not be an adequate reason to pre-
vent same-sex couples from marrying.160 No state precludes all but the 
                                                                                                                      
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 30 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). 
157 Cf. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 30 (“Plainly, the ability or desire to procreate is not a 
prerequisite for marriage. The elderly are permitted to marry.”). 
158 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is of fun-
damental importance for all individuals.”). 
159 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“Marriage is about much more 
than producing children.”). 
160See Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding 
Placement of Children, 40 Fam. L.Q. 381, 386 (2006) (“[T]he claim that children raised with 
two heterosexual parents do better with respect to their academic, social, emotional, or 
behavioral development than children raised by two same-sex parents is not supported by 
the evidence.”). 
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most optimal parents from marrying, and with good reason. If the 
state were to do that, many children would be denied the opportunity 
of being in a good—even if not optimal—home. By allowing the state 
to ban same-sex marriage, the state would be permitted to reduce the 
number of marital homes in which children might thrive. 
 It was almost as if the court believed that same-sex couples would 
abstain from raising children if not permitted to marry. But that has 
not been the experience in New York, where a growing number of 
unmarried same-sex couples are having and raising children.161 In-
deed, New York permits each member of a same-sex couple to be rec-
ognized as the legal parent of the same child.162 Consequently, this 
rationale for denying same-sex couples the right to marry makes even 
less sense. In the end, the New York court justifies the state’s same-sex 
marriage ban by appealing to the interests of children, even though 
unmarried same-sex couples are having and raising children and even 
though prohibiting same-sex marriages will deprive children of the 
benefits that permitting their parents to marry might offer.163 
 As this case illustrates, many of the purported public policy reasons 
cited to support same-sex marriage bans, like similar policies against 
interracial marriage, are specious. Arguably, the right to marry a same-
sex partner, like the right to marry a different-sex partner, is protected 
by the Federal Constitution.164 This article’s focus, however, is not on 
whether the Federal Constitution protects such a right but merely on 
the lessons offered by the Native American polygamy cases for interstate 
recognition practices. 
                                                                                                                      
161 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the “tens of 
thousands of children . . . currently being raised by same-sex couples in New York”). 
162 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing second-parent adop-
tions). 
163 See Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 32 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“Civil marriage provides 
tangible legal protections and economic benefits to married couples and their children, 
and tens of thousands of children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New 
York. Depriving these children of the benefits and protections available to the children of 
opposite-sex couples is antithetical to their welfare . . . .”) 
164 See Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 23, 49 (2005) (“The most obvious constitutional problem with the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is that it interferes with the federal constitu-
tional right to marry.”). 
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B. The Defense of Marriage Act 
 As a general matter, tribes no longer recognize polygamous mar-
riages.165 Recently, however, two same-sex tribal marriages have been 
celebrated.166 It might seem that these marriages, like tribal polyga-
mous marriages, would have to be recognized in all states. 
 If states were required to recognize tribal same-sex marriages, the 
jurisprudence suggests that states would be bound to recognize such 
unions only if they were (1) contracted on Native lands, (2) in accord 
with tribal custom or law, and (3) by at least one tribal member.167 
Such interjurisdictional recognition is, however, not required because 
the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA” or “the Act”) specifi-
cally authorizes the non-recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated 
elsewhere.168 The Act reads: 
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or In-
dian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a 
right or claim arising from such relationship.169 
 If DOMA were repealed, then, subject to the limitations mentioned 
above, some same-sex marriages would be entitled to recognition as 
long as such marriages were still permitted by tribal law.170 Although 
                                                                                                                      
165 See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 54 (“Times have changed. Most, if not all, Indian 
tribes no longer recognize polygamous marriages and Indian people tend to utilize the 
divorce laws as much as non-Indian people.” (citations omitted)). 
166 See Jeffrey S. Jacobi, Note, Two Spirits, Two Eras, Same Sex: For a Traditionalist Perspec-
tive on Native American Tribal Same-Sex Marriage Policy, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 823, 824–27 
(2006) (discussing two Cherokee women who obtained a marriage license in Oklahoma 
and subsequently wed in a ceremony presided over by a Cherokee nation certified minis-
ter); see also Bill Graves, Coquille Tribe Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Portland Oregonian, May 
22, 2009, at B3. (“A Coquille Indian Tribe law allowing same-sex marriage took effect this 
week, and two women plan to marry Sunday on the tribe’s Coos Bay reservation. Tribal 
member Kitzen Branting, 26, and her partner, Jeni Branting, 28, of Edmonds, Wash., will 
become the first same-sex couple to legally marry in Oregon, though their marriage will 
be recognized only by the tribe.”). 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 32–33 (specifying these limitations). 
168 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 70 (“DOMA allows, however, that if a tribe authorizes or 
recognizes same-sex marriage, states and other tribes have no obligation to recognize that 
[relationship].” (citing Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)). 
169 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
170 See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 55 (“[T]here remains the distinct possibility that one 
or more of the 560-plus federally recognized Indian tribes will take action to recognize 
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such interjurisdictional recognition might have symbolic value, very few 
same-sex marriages would meet the relevant criteria. As such, the issue 
of interjurisdictional recognition of same-sex tribal marriages would 
rarely, if ever, arise.171 Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile to consider 
some of the possible effects of a repeal of DOMA. 
C. The Lessons of DOMA and the Native American Polygamous Marriage 
Cases 
 Although President Obama said he would support DOMA’s re-
peal, the United States Department of Justice recently filed a brief in 
support of DOMA’s constitutionality.172 Further, there has been little 
or no effort in Congress to repeal DOMA.173 Given this, it seems quite 
unlikely that Congress will either repeal DOMA or affirmatively act to 
protect same-sex relationships.174 
 Even if Congress did repeal DOMA, it is unclear whether Con-
gress could require states to recognize same-sex marriages validly 
celebrated elsewhere.175 Opponents of such a measure might argue 
that Congress cannot force states to recognize marriages valid in 
other states without violating a principle of federalism. It should be 
noted, however, that DOMA may violate principles of federalism.176 
                                                                                                                      
same-sex marriage in their jurisdictions.”). But see id. at 70 (suggesting that the tribes 
might decide not to recognize such unions). 
171 See Jacobi, supra note 166, at 827 (“Unlike the Cherokee, not all federally recog-
nized Native American tribes have the ability to issue marriage licenses, and those that can 
issue marriage licenses do so rarely.” (citing Sheila K. Stogsdill, Tribe Mulls Their Laws on 
Marriage, Daily Oklahoman, May 18, 2004, at 3A)). 
172 See Stephen Dinan & Christina Bellantoni, Gay Man Eyed for Pentagon Post: Obama 
Still Criticized for Slow Action on Pledge, Wash. Times, June 18, 2009, at A1 (discussing the 
view of gay rights groups with respect to “how far Mr. Obama still has to go to make good 
on his campaign promises . . . to repeal the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act”); Editorial, A 
Bad Call on Gay Rights, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2009, at A20 (criticizing the Department of 
Justice’s brief in support of DOMA). 
173 See Carolyn Lochhead, Activists Shrug at Obama’s Action, S.F. Chron., June 18, 2009, 
at A1 (stating that “there is no effort to repeal DOMA”). 
174 David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of 
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 448 (1996). 
175 Michael A. Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration 
Law, 11 Widener J. Pub. L. 475, 489 (2002) (“Congress could repeal DOMA.”). 
176 See Mark P. Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer-
Lawrence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After Lawrence, 38 Creighton L. 
Rev. 421, 430 (2005). States are completely left out of the DOMA scheme: 
DOMA does not permit each state to decide whether to recognize a marriage 
celebrated in another state, as one might expect a federalism statute to do. It 
does not even permit each state to refuse to recognize a marriage validly 
celebrated elsewhere if that marriage violates an important public policy of 
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After all, DOMA did not give states the power to refuse to recognize 
any marriage that violates public policy.177 Instead, it picks out only 
one kind of marriage and subjects that union to unique treatment.178 
If Congress had been genuinely interested in promoting federalism, it 
would have given states the option not to recognize any marriage val-
idly celebrated elsewhere or, perhaps, the option not to recognize any 
marriage that violated an important public policy. DOMA masquer-
ades as a statute promoting states’ rights but is really designed to im-
pose undeserved burdens on a disfavored minority. Similarly, the pro-
posed Federal Marriage Amendment is argued to strengthen state 
power in terms of federalism, even though it strips states of the power 
to require the recognition of same-sex marriage valid in the domicile 
at the time of celebration.179 
 Similar arguments that Congress’s requiring the recognition of 
same-sex unions celebrated elsewhere would somehow violate the 
Tenth Amendment are also erroneous.180 The Tenth Amendment has 
been construed as not limiting the powers of Congress expressly con-
ferred by the Constitution.181 Here, Congress’s exclusive power to 
make treaties and fashion choice of law rules grant it, and not the 
states, the power to require the recognition of same-sex marriages.182 
 Federalism does not bar Congress from requiring recognition of 
same-sex unions if it desires to do so. First, the Native American po-
lygamy cases suggest that the federal government could enter into a 
treaty with another country, e.g., Canada, that included a provision 
specifying that same-sex marriages validly celebrated there would be 
                                                                                                                      
the forum state. Rather, it picks out one kind of marriage, namely, same-sex 
marriages, and imposes this unique disability on them. 
Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1703, 1796 (“[T]he proposed federal marriage amend-
ment, which would constitutionalize the legitimacy of only traditional marriages, is . . . 
objectionable as a matter of federalism.”); Lynn D. Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection 
for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 439, 442 (2006) (“[A] clear, textual federal 
constitutional amendment is the best way to simultaneously protect marriage and to pre-
serve federalism in family law.”). 
180 See U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
181 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (“If a power is delegated to 
Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of 
that power to the States . . . .”) 
182 See supra notes 172–177 and accompanying text. 
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recognized here.183 Second, many supporting the constitutionality of 
DOMA have suggested that Congress has broad and possibly plenary 
powers with respect to fashioning choice of law or full faith and credit 
rules.184 But if Congress has plenary powers with respect to such rules, 
then it could require recognition of same-sex unions validly cele-
brated in another state without violating constitutional guarantees. 
 Perhaps Congress may not have plenary power under the Full 
Faith and Credit clause to modify the faith and credit to be given to 
marriages. Even so, it might be noted that the statute hypothesized 
here would be less subject to constitutional attack than is DOMA 
which seems to violate equal protection guarantees.185 Further, those 
who believe that the Clause permits Congress to increase but not de-
crease the credit due to other states’ judgments or laws would argue 
that a statute requiring recognition of same-sex unions validly cele-
brated elsewhere would not violate constitutional guarantees.186 Thus, 
it would seem that Congress has the power to require states to recog-
nize same-sex unions validly celebrated in other states. Further, the 
Native American polygamous marriage jurisprudence suggests that it 
                                                                                                                      
183 See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 422 (1920) (suggesting that the treaty 
power is very broad). Indeed, the Court suggested that treaties would be valid and binding 
as long as made under the authority of the United States. See id. at 432 (“[T]reaties made 
under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land.”). 
184 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, 
Section 1 and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 307, 336 
(1998) (“[E]vidence clearly demonstrates that the Framers intended that Congress be 
granted plenary power to determine the extent of faith and credit to be accorded state 
acts, records, and proceedings in sister states.”); Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage 
Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors 
That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915, 965 (2006) (“On nu-
merous occasions, however, the Court has indicated in dicta that Congress has the power 
under the Effects Clause to create full faith and credit rules that differ from those that the 
Court itself has identified.”); Mathew D. Staver, Transsexualism and the Binary Divide: Deter-
mining Sex Using Objective Criteria, 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 459, 468 (2008) (“Under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, the Constitution gives the Congress the power to determine the 
‘effects’ of an act, record, or judicial proceeding of another state.”). 
185 See U.S. Const. art IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); Strasser, supra note 176, at 436 (suggesting that 
DOMA is unconstitutional because it is motivated by animus); Mark Strasser, Loving the 
Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
279, 279 (1997) (suggesting that DOMA is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons). 
186 See Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of 
Obligation, 1 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 1, 44 (2005) (“There is no question that 
Congress can increase the Full Faith and Credit due to state laws and judgments.”). 
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would not be unprecedented for Congress to require the recognition 
of marriages that are viewed by the states as violating local public pol-
icy. Thus, there would be no constitutional bar to Congress’s requir-
ing interstate recognition of same-sex unions validly celebrated in the 
domicile. 
Conclusion 
 Past cases regarding the recognition of Native American polyga-
mous practices suggest that Congress can require states to recognize 
marriages that are thought to violate an important state public policy. 
Moreover, existing jurisprudence suggests both that such a require-
ment would not be unprecedented and that the states would have to 
recognize such unions as a matter of federal supremacy. 
 Same-sex marriages are sufficiently different from polygamous 
marriages that the recognition of one will hardly require the recogni-
tion of the other. For example, states recognizing same-sex unions do 
not also recognize polygamous unions. Nonetheless, Native American 
polygamy cases illustrate that Congress not only can but has required 
states to recognize marriages even in states with a public policy pro-
hibiting such marriages. 
 While Congress may not require states to recognize same-sex 
marriage in the foreseeable future, good policy reasons would sup-
port such a statute. Something as fundamental as one’s marriage 
should not be permitted to go in and out of existence depending 
upon where one’s plane lands. Similarly, one should not be forced to 
sacrifice one’s marriage for a new job to support one’s family. The 
current system puts interests at risk that are simply too important to 
be left to the wishes, whims, or prejudices of individual legislatures. It 
can only be hoped that Congress will sometime soon repeal DOMA 
and secure for same-sex couples and their families some of the bene-
fits and security that most other people simply take for granted. 
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